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This paper redeﬁnes technical eﬃciency by incorporating provision of environmental goods
as one of the outputs of the farm within a multi-outptut distance function framework.
Permanent and rough grassland area are used as a proxy for the provision of
environmental goods. The multi-output distance function approach is used to estimate
technical eﬃciency.
A Bayesian procedure involving the use of a Gibbs sampler is used to estimate the farm
speciﬁc eﬃciency as well as the coeﬃcients of the distance function. In addition, a number
of explanatory variables for the eﬃciency were introduced in the analysis and posterior
distributions of those were obtained. The methodology is applied to panel data on 215
dairy farms in England and Wales from the Defra Farm Business Survey. Results show
that both farm eﬃciency rankings and determinants of ineﬃciency change when provision
of environmental outputs by farms is incorporated in the eﬃciency analysis, which may
have important political implications.
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Introduction
The environmental goods (e.g. habitat for insects, bird species) and bads (e.g. pollution
derived from the use of fertilisers) provided by farms create positive and negative
externalities respectively in that the additional beneﬁts and costs to society derived from
the farmers' actions do not result in compensation to farmers for the beneﬁts provided nor
pay to society for the harm done. The non-existence of a market for the good and/or bad
provided leads to a loss of economic eﬃciency giving governments an argument to
intervene in order to internalise the externality.
Both positive and negative externalities have characterised the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). Thus, the CAP in the last decades was based on price support which, as
well as technological progress, has favoured intensiﬁcation, specialisation and
concentration of production. This has led to habitat loss and a decline in biodiversity, i.e.
it has produced negative externalities (Potter and Goodwin, 1998). The introduction of
set-aside in 1988 aimed to reduce overproduction of crops such as cereals and oilseed rape;
and to deliver environmental beneﬁts. This measure was voluntary when it was introduced
and became compulsory in 1992 with the MacSharry reform.
In recognition of the high ecological and environmental impact of intensiﬁcation of
agriculture, agri-environmental schemes (AES) were introduced with the MacSharry
reform in 1992 and have been developed under Regulation (EEC) 2078/92, which allows
MS to provide support to farmers for making environmental improvements to their land by
changing farming practices (Hynes et al., 2008). With the introduction of the Agenda 2000
Member States (MS) may make direct payments conditional on compliance with
environmental targets (i.e. farmers are required to follow certain production practices in
order to receive direct support).
Payments for environmental goods through agri-environmental schemes aim to help
provide environmental outputs at the local level and eﬀectively pay the farmers for what is
considered a social beneﬁt. This is in line with the idea of having a sustainable
agricultural sector. According to this idea, the UK Government set up an independent
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Policy Commission on the future of farming and food. The Commission's report provided
a vision of a sustainable, competitive and diverse farming and food sector, playing a
dynamic role in the rural economy and delivering eﬀectively and eﬃciently the
environmental goals we as a society set for ourselves (Defra, 2002). The UK Government
released in 2002 its vision on sustainability of the farming and food sectors which was in
harmony with the independent Policy Commission report outcomes.
It seems clear that agricultural practices (i.e. land use) have an impact on the quality and
availability of natural habitats which can have an eﬀect on wildlife and biodiversity
(OECD, 1999; Mattison and Norris, 2005). For instance, many bird species depending on
permanent pasture land (OECD 1999) can be aﬀected in case this land use is changed.
Although accounting for multiple outputs has been treated to a large extent within the
productivity and eﬃciency literature, few publications have incorporated externalities as
an output of the farm (Dorfman and Koop 2005), being negative externalities such as
pollutants the core of research (Färe et al. 1989; Färe, Grosskopf, and Tyteca 1996;
Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen 1999; Färe, Grosskopf, and Pasurka 2001; Reinhard, Lovell
and Thijssen 2002; Lansink and Reinhard 2004; Murty, Kumar, and Paul 2006). Yet few
studies have included the provision of environmental goods (e.g. biodiversity) in
production related analysis. An exception is the publication by Omer, Pascual and Russell
(2007) who conducted an study in the productivity performance and biodiversity
conservation in intensive agricultural systems using a stochastic production frontier
approach. These authors included a biodiversity index (BI) based on measures of plant
species richness to examine the relationship between the state of biodiversity and output
in a specialised intensive farming system. A positive relationship between state of
biodiversity and productivity was found, which suggests that implementing biodiversity
conservation policies may be beneﬁcial to productivity, rejecting the idea that
environmental regulations have an adverse eﬀect on productivity. The omission of
environmental outputs provided by farms in production and eﬃciency analysis may lead to
biased results, which if used for policy support, could mislead policy makers in their policy
decisions. We take into account the environmental outputs by incorporating an indicator
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for environmental outputs as one of the outputs of the farms in the production function
within a multi-output distance function approach.
Inferences about ﬁrm speciﬁc ineﬃciencies have been widely reported in the literature. It
is also common to ﬁnd in the literature a ranking of ﬁrms according to their mean
eﬃciencies (Coelli and Perelman 1999; Coelli and Perelman 2000) or plots for mean,
median and maximum eﬃciency levels (Koop 2003). We investigate the consequences in
eﬃciency rankings when provision of environmental outputs is incorporated into eﬃciency
analysis. Accounting for environmental outputs when measuring eﬃciency is in
concordance with policies aiming to achieve a sustainable agriculture such as the provision
of both marketable goods (e.g. cereals, milk and oilseeds) and non-marketable goods (e.g.
diversity of ﬂora and fauna and landscape views) by farms. Information about farm
eﬃciency levels is key for policy makers to identify which farms may be in need of support
(i.e. those farms that are less eﬃcient) and implement support policies (e.g. facilitation of
credit to access to new machinery, training). If the information received by policy makers
about farm eﬃciency levels is not harmonised with policy aims, policy measures may be
ineﬀective at supporting the right farms. In other words, using a conventional eﬃciency
measure (i.e. by not incorporating the provision of environmental goods by farms in
eﬃciency analysis) may lead to policy makers, whose aim is to support those farms in line
with sustainable agriculture, to target the wrong farms when designing a eﬃciency support
policy. In addition, we examine how a measure that accounts for the provision of
environmental outputs may aﬀect the results associated with explaining technical
eﬃciency. The following sections proceed by ﬁrst discussing the methodology, then the
sources and construction of the data. The empirical results are then presented and
discussed, and the ﬁnal section concludes.
Methodology
We study milk producer farms in England and Wales. These producers have an annual
milk quota and a functioning quota leasing market in which producers can lease in and/or
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lease out milk during the production year. Therefore we include in the analysis the annual
quota Q, leasing in quota qui and leasing out quota quo by treating the total annual quota
after milk quota trade Q+ qui− quo as a normal input.
Optimising behaviour is the assumption upon which conventional microeconomics is
based. This means that producers optimise their production by not wasting resources and
therefore operate near their production possibilities set. However there may be an array of
motives for which not all producers are successful in optimising production. If this is the
case technical eﬃciency is not achieved and measuring the distance between the
production frontier and actual production is a crucial policy interest. From a policy and
managerial perspective it is important to identify the determinants of ineﬃciencies and
learn how ineﬃcient producers are on average as well as individually (Färe, Grosskopf, and
Lovell 1994; Farrell 1957). The departure point of any technical eﬃciency analysis is the
deﬁnition of the production technology of a ﬁrm. This can be characterised in terms of a
technology set, the output set of production technology, and the production frontier.
Distance functions are useful since they describe technology in a way that eﬃciency can be
measured for multi-input and multi-output enterprises (Coelli et al. 2005). An output
distance function describes the degree to which a ﬁrm can expand its output given its
input vector. We start from a producible output set, which is the set of all outputs that
can be feasibly produced using the set of all inputs. The output set for production
technology is deﬁned as
P (x,Q+ qui− quo) =
{
y ∈ RM+ : x can produce y
}
=
= {y : (x, y) ∈ T} (1)
where y refers to all outputs of the farm including milk and the environmental output and
x refers to all inputs used in the farm including the annual allocation of quota after trade
Q+ qui− quo.
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The output distance function is deﬁned on the output set P (x,Q+ qui− quo) as
DO (x, y,Q+ qui− quo) = min
{
θ :
(
y
θ
)
∈ P (x,Q+ qui− quo)
}
for all x ∈ RK+ (2)
which means that the initial allocation of quota after trade Q+ qui− quo, is treated in the
same way as conventional inputs (x) .
Assuming a translog functional form for the parametric distance function with M outputs
and K inputs provides several attractive properties including ﬂexibility, easy to derive and
permit the imposition of homogeneity, which makes it the preferred in the literature
(Coelli and Perelman 1999; Lovell et al. 1994; Brümmer, Glauben, and Thijssen 2002;
Brümmer, Glauben, and Lu 2006).
lnDOi = α0 +
M∑
m=1
αm ln ymi +
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
αmn ln ymi ln yni +
K∑
k=1
βk lnxki +
+
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkl lnxki lnxli +
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
δkm lnxki ln ymi
i = 1, ..., N (3)
where i denotes the ith farm in the sample; qui and Q are included in x as inputs; and quo
are part of y as an output. By using linear homogeneity of the output distance function,
equation (3) can be transformed into an estimable regression model by normalising the
function by one of the outputs (Brümmer, Glauben, and Lu 2006; Brümmer, Glauben, and
Thijssen 2002; Coelli and Perelman 1999; Coelli and Perleman 2000; Lovell et al. 1994;
Orea 2002; O'Donell and Coelli 2005). From Euler's theorem, homogeneity of degree one
in output implies:
M∑
m=1
αm +
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
αmn ln yni +
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
δkm lnxki = 1 (4)
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which will be satisﬁed if
∑M
m=1 αm = 1,
∑M
m=1 αmn = 0 for all n, and
∑M
m=1 δkm = 0 for all
k. Substituting these constraints is equivalent to normalising by one of the outputs, which
leads to the following expressions:
lnDO
(
yi
y2i
, x
)
= lnDo
1
y2i
(yi, xi) (5)
− ln yˆ2 = α0 +
M∑
m=1
α1 ln
ymi
y2i
+
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
αmn ln
ymi
y2i
ln
yni
y2i
+
+
K∑
k=1
βk lnxki
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkl lnxkl lnxli +
+
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
δkm lnxki ln
ymi
y2i
+ κ1ti + κ2t
2
i + εi − zi (6)
where t and t2 are the year and year squared, which are incorporated to account for
technical change during the period studied; κ1 and κ2 are the parameters associated to the
year and year squared variables; εi is a symmetric random error term that accounts for
statistical noise and zi is a non-negative random variable associated with technical
ineﬃciency.
Monotonicity constraints involve constraints on functions of the partial derivatives of the
distance function. As pointed out by O'Donnell and Coelli (2005) the elasticities of the
distance function with respect to inputs and outputs are important derivatives.
∂ lnDo
∂ lnxk
= βk +
K∑
l=1
βkl lnxli +
M∑
m=1
δkm ln
ymi
y2i
(7)
∂ lnDo
∂ ln ym
= αm +
M∑
n=1
αmn ln
yni
y2i
+
K∑
k=1
δkm lnxki (8)
For Do to be non-increasing in x
∂ lnDo
∂ lnxk
≤ 0 while for Do to be non-decreasing in y
∂ lnDo
∂ ln ym
≥ 0. We did not to impose monotonicity using inequality restrictions in order to
investigate the eﬀects of including the environmental output indicator on the rest of
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parameters, including whether the parameter estimates were more, or less compatible with
economic theory after the inclusion of the environmental output indicator.
We include in the output distance function approach the following proxy indicator for
provision of environmental goods
EG = permanent grassland+ rough grassland (9)
where permanent pasture is the land used permanently, during 5 years or more, for
herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated or growing wild (European Council 2003) and
rough grassland is non-intensive grazing grassland. Permanent and rough pasture are
reported to be likely to contribute to positive environmental eﬀects. Thus, the EC
Regulation 1782/2003 considers that permanent pasture has a positive environmental
eﬀect and as a consequence it is appropriate to adopt measures to encourage the
maintenance of existing permanent pasture to avoid a massive conversion into arable land.
Article 5 of the regulation, which establishes the principles for keeping agricultural land in
a good and environmental condition, states in its second paragraph that Member States
shall ensure that land that was under permanent pasture at the date provided by the area
aid. . . is maintained under permanent pasture. Permanent and rough grassland in
agricultural systems are close to natural ecosystems. Ecological services associated with
the vegetative cover of grassland are the prevention of soil erosion, renewing ground water
and ﬂooding control by enhancing inﬁltration and reducing water runoﬀ (Altieri 1999).
The fact that permanent grassland and rough grassland are not disturbed by tillage
favours the development microorganisms in the soil which do beneﬁcial activities
decomposition of plant residues, manures and organic wastes (Altieri 1999). Gardner and
Brown (1998) reviewed the publication ﬁndings on the eﬀects of organic agriculture on
micro and macro ﬂora fauna. From this review positive impacts were found on soil
organisms, invertebrates and possibly positive impacts on bird and mammal populations
were associated with permanent pasture. In addition many bird species are dependent on
the presence of permanent pasture land (OECD 1999).
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The use of a proxy to account for provision of environmental outputs based on inputs may
be seen as problematic. However, the fact that the index is based on inputs, outputs or
both is largely irrelevant. The information provided by the index is crucial to account for
the provision of environmental output by farms. The use of a proxy for measuring the
provision of environmental outputs by farms is the best possible alternative since there is
no information in the FBS that accounts for environmental goods such as ground water
renewed, water inﬁltration, decomposition of plant residues, manures and organic matter,
soil organisms, invertebrates and bird abundance. Besides, even if such information existed
from other datasets (e.g. farm bird surveys) it would be diﬃcult to associate the values
with particular farms. Therefore, while the use of any proxy introduces measurement error
in the variable which may lead to biased estimates, it is our best available option to
account for the provision of environmental goods by the farm.
Estimation
A translog form is speciﬁed for the distance function as shown above. If we stack all
variables into matrices equation we can write
yi = Xiβ + εi − zιT (10)
z ∼ G (Wφ,α) (11)
Where, yi denotes a vector of T observations on the dependent variable; Xi is T ×m
matrix of inputs, other outputs and interlinkages between them given a translog function;
εi is a T × 1 vector accounting for a normal error term; z is a vector T × 1 that accounts
for the ineﬃciency. It follows a gamma distribution with parameters α and farm mean
eﬃciency; W is a T × r matrix of explanatory variables for ineﬃciency and φ is a r × 1
vector of parameters associated with the explanatory variables for ineﬃciency.
Our choice of estimation methodology is Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC,
see Koop 2003 for a detailed explanation). This method is easily implemented in the
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context of the frontier model employed in this paper. As with the majority of current
Bayesian applications, we have limited ourselves to mainly reporting only the ﬁrst two
moments of the posterior distributions (the mean and standard deviation). However, the
examination of the full posterior of each of the model parameters obtained using MCMC
can often give the investigator further useful information. Computationally, MCMC
methods do not impose any great burden, with the model being estimated in a matter of
minutes. Bayesian methods are ﬂexible, providing the optional use of prior information,
and treat inequality restrictions in a way that classical estimation cannot. In this paper we
have been broadly non informative and have chosen not imposed inequality conditions,
other than those required for ineﬃciency to be non negative. Therefore, if classical
methods (e.g. Maximum Likelihood) were employed to estimate the models within this
paper they would, most likely, yield similar results to the Bayesian ones produced herein.
An advantage of the MCMC approach is that the distributions of the latent variables, such
as the individual ﬁrm ineﬃciencies, are automatically mapped as part of the estimation
process, rather than having to be estimated ex-post as in the classical case.
The conditional likelihood function
The assumption about the errors deﬁnes the likelihood function. In this case a normal
distribution is assumed with mean 0T and covariance matrix h
−1IT ; Xi are ﬁxed non
stochastic variables; εi and εj are independent of one another for i 6= j or in other words
the errors are independent over all individuals and time periods; zi and εj are independent
of one another for all i and j.
p (y|β, h, z) =
N∏
i=1
h
T
2
(2pi)
T
2
{
exp
[
−h
2
N∑
i=1
(yi −Xiβ + ziιT )
]}
∝ hT2 exp
[
−h
2
(yi −Xiβ + ziιT )
′
(yi −Xiβ + ziιT )
]
(12)
where z = (z1, . . . , zN)
′
. Rearranging y˜i = [yi + ziιT ] the following expression is obtained
10
p (y|β, h, z) ∝ hT2 exp
[
−h
2
(y˜i −Xiβ)
′
(y˜i −Xiβ)
]
(13)
The priors
The likelihood function must be complemented with a prior distribution on the parameters
(β, h, z) in order to carry out Bayesian inference. A independent Normal-Gamma prior is
used for the coeﬃcients in the production frontier and the error precision (see Koop 2003
for a more detailed explanation on these priors).
The distribution of the ineﬃciency vector is determined by the distribution of z. The prior
for z is hierarchical, as in Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000) and Koop, Osiewalski and
Steel (1997) in the sense that a r-dimensional parameter vector φ = (φ1, . . . , φr) is added
where each of the elements of the parameter vector φ measures the eﬀect of the ineﬃciency
explanatory variables wij into the ineﬃciency distribution. Given φ, z has a probability
density function given by
p (zi|φ) = fG
(
zi|α, µ−1z (φ)
)
=
zα−1i
µjΓ (α)
exp
(
−µ−1z (φ) zi
)
(14)
where Γ (.) indicates the Gamma function and fG (zi|α, µ−1z (φ)) is the Gamma density
with parameters α and µ−1z (φ), mean µz (φ), and variance µ
2
z (φ). This prior is commonly
used in the literature (van den Broeck et al. 1994; Koop, Steel, and Osiewalski 1995; and
Fernández, Koop, and Steel 2000). Assuming α = 1, the ineﬃciency distribution is
exponential and the ineﬃciency prior becomes
p
(
zi|µ−1z (φ)
)
∝ exp
(
−µ−1z (φ) zi
)
(15)
As in Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000) we take µ−1z (φ) to depend on φ in the following
way
µ−1z (φ) =
r∏
j=1
φ
wij
j (16)
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where wij are dummy variables and wi1 = 1. The prior for each of the elements of the
vector φ are taken to be independent and follow a Gamma density with hyperparameters
ej and gj which values are associated with prior information about the location of the
eﬃciency distribution. The values for the hyperparameters are e1 = 1 and g1 = − ln (r∗)
where r∗ denotes the prior median of the distribution. In this case g1 = − ln (0.80) which
is consistent with the belief that under a competitive market farms must be close to the
frontier (i.e. full eﬃciency) (van den Broeck et al. 1994). In addition this value is in
concordance with results of previous empirical work by Hadley (2006) on eﬃciency of
dairy farms in England and Wales. In the empirical analysis for j > 1 ej = gj = 1 which
implies relatively non-informative values which centre the prior for φj over 1.
p (φ) =
r∏
j=1
fG (φj|ej, gj) (17)
The joint posterior
Once the likelihood and the priors are deﬁned it is possible to obtain the joint posterior
distribution, which deﬁnes the Bayesian model.
p (β, h, µz, z|y) = p
(
y|β, h, µ−1z , z
)
p (β) p (h) p
(
z|µ−1z (φ)
)
p (φ) (18)
The conditional posteriors
Under a Bayesian approach the posterior inference can be based on the conditional
distributions of all the parameters given the observables (Fernández, Koop, and Steel
2000). Knowing the conditional distributions enables the simulation of the joint posterior
distributions of the parameters of interest using the MCMC sampler. The conditional
posterior for an informative β is a Normal distribution (Koop 2003).
p
(
β|h, µ−1z , z, y
)
∼ N
(
β¯, V¯
)
(19)
The conditional posterior density for h is
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p
(
h|β, µ−1z , z, y
)
∼ G
(
s¯−2, v¯
)
(20)
As pointed out above for the ineﬃciencies a hierarchical prior is used. The conditional
posterior for φ is proportional to the product of p (z|µ−1z (φ)) and p (φ). As pointed out by
Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1997) the fact that the wij are 0-1 dummy variables simpliﬁes
the conditional posterior for φ. This conditional posterior has a Gamma form
p
(
φj|y, β, h, µ−1z (φ) , z
)
= fG
φj|ej + N∑
i=1
wij, gj +
N∑
i=1
wijzi
∏
s 6=j
φwiss
 (21)
p
(
zi|β, h, µ−1z (φ) , y, ρ
)
∝ exp
−hT
2
[
zi −X iβ + yi +
µ−1z (φ)
Th
]2 I(z ≥ 0) (22)
where I is an indicator function which equals 1 is z ≥ 0 and equals 0 otherwise.
Data
The analysis uses a balanced panel data from the Farm Business Survey (FBS) for the
years 2000-2005. A total of 215 dairy farms in England and Wales are included in the
dataset. Panel data is advantageous relative to cross-sectional data since farm speciﬁc
eﬀects can be included, unlike when cross-sectional data is only available (Kumbhakar et
al. 2008).
The FBS data includes a large amount of information related to the farm enterprises. The
variables we use are milk, other outputs, environmental output, utilised agricultural area
(UAA), herd size, the allocation of annual quota after trade, labour, machinery and
general costs and livestock costs (Table 1).
It seems reasonable to assume that the eﬃciency of dairy farms with similar characteristics
may be related. Variables used to explain ineﬃciencies are shown in the Table 2. The use
of dummy variables instead of continuous variables is due to the computational diﬃculty
associated with using continuous variables under a Bayesian approach to analyse technical
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eﬃciency (Koop et al., 1997). A dummy variable accounting for set-aside payment was
created by dividing the total set aside payments to the farm by the total agricultural area.
This eﬀectively measures the percentage of the total agricultural area allocated to produce
arable crops. By obtaining the median of this measure a dummy variable was created,
which eﬀectively diﬀerentiates between those farms that produce milk and arable crops
(i.e. those above the median of the measure) and those which produce mainly milk (those
below the median of the measure). Two organisational structures may be behind these
type of farms: those who use part of their arable crop production to feed the animals; and,
those who obtain the feedstuﬀ from outside the farm. Environmental payments include
agri-environmental payments and other environmental schemes. A dummy variable for
environmental payments was created to examine the eﬀect of such payments on farm
eﬃciency. This was created by dividing the total environmental payments received by the
farm by the total agricultural area, then giving a value of 1 for values above the median
and zero for values below the median. Financial pressure has been used previously in the
literature as a possible determinant of eﬃciency and found to be negatively signiﬁcant
(Hadley 2006; Paul, Johnston, and Frengley 2000; Iraizoz, Bardaji, and Rapun 2005).
Hadley (2006) uses a ratio of rental equivalent (i.e. the sum of interest and rent paid,
charges that must be paid when they fall due and non payment of which could result in
loss of tenure or foreclosure of loans) to gross margin; Paul, Johnston and Frengley (2000)
use a debt/equity ratio to account for ﬁnancial pressure; and Iraizoz, Bardaji and Rapun
(2005) use a ratio of paid rents and interests to gross margin. In this research a ratio
between external liabilities and total assets is calculated and used to account for ﬁnancial
pressure. Here, ﬁnancial pressure is the ratio of liabilities of the farm divided by the assets
of the farm. The mean of the ﬁnancial pressure ratio from the sample is 0.10 whereas the
median is 0.05. A dummy variable was created allocating a value of one for those ratio
values larger than 0.10.
A dummy variable was created to account for the level of participation in the milk quota
market. This was obtained by adding the quota bought/sold and the quota leased in/out
during the period; dividing this amount of quota traded by the initial amount of quota;
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obtaining the median of this result and assigning a value of one for those farms that traded
more than the median farm and assigning a value of 0 otherwise. The introduction of this
dummy investigates whether farms participating in a larger scale in the quota market are
diﬀerent to those that participate less in terms of eﬃciency. This diﬀerentiation between
participants and non-participants may be reﬂecting diﬀerent types of technologies.
Farm size is considered a relevant determinant of eﬃciency in the literature (Hadley 2006;
Iraizoz, Bardaji, and Rapun 2005). The number of cows was used to create a proxy
dummy variable for farm size. This has been used in the literature by Tauer and Belbase
(1987). Here a dummy variable that accounts for production intensity was also introduced.
Firstly a ratio of the number of cows divided by the size of the farm was calculated. The
median of the ratio was then obtained (1.07) and for values larger than the median the
dummy variable takes the value 1 and 0 otherwise. A dummy accounting for farms in
LFAs was included in the analysis to examine whether farms located in LFAs where less
eﬃcient that farms located in non-LFAs. Hadley (2006) found a small negative eﬀect on
eﬃciency of dairy farms located in LFAs. Barnes (2008) also ﬁnds similar results for dairy
farms in Scotland. In addition dummy variables for GORs (Government Oﬃce Regions) in
England and Wales were introduced to account for any diﬀerences in eﬃciency between
regions. The benchmark region is West Midlands.
The unlogged data was normalised (i.e. divided by the geometric sample mean) so that
each unlogged variable had a sample mean of one. This means that the monotonicity
conditions in equation (6) can be expressed as αm ≥ 0 and βk ≤ 0. However, the reported
coeﬃcients in this paper have the reverse signs due to the sign of the dependent variable
being the opposite of equation (6).
Empirical results
Table 3 reports the mean coeﬃcients of the MCMC sample observations for both models:
the model that does not include the environmental output (M1); and, the model that
incorporated provision of environmental outputs (M2). Initially, a total number of 150,000
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iterations were generated from which every 5th iteration was retained. This makes 30,000
random draws were generated from the conditional distributions with 5,000 draws
discarded and 25,000 draws retained. These 25,000 draws can be considered as a sample
from the joint posterior density function of the parameters. The point estimates of the
coeﬃcients for the outputs and inputs have all the right sign except for labour and
livestock costs for M2. Table 3 also shows the 90% posterior coverage regions calculated as
the ﬁfth and ninety ﬁfth percentiles of the MCMC sample observations. By examining the
estimated conditional posteriors of the output and input coeﬃcients it can be seen that
the associated coverage region for labour costs for both M1 and M2 include zero, meaning
that there is a positive probability that the monotonicity is violated. This also occurs for
annual allocation of quota, number of cows, machinery and general costs and livestock
costs in M2. No technological eﬀect was found in any of the models.
Technical eﬃciency
The technical eﬃciency of the sample of the dairy farms range from 0.32 to 0.98 with
median 0.89 and mean 0.85 for M1 whereas technical eﬃciency values range from 0.01 to
0.99 with median 0.39 and mean 0.36 for M2. The two conditional posterior p.d.f. for
mean eﬃciency across the sample of dairy farms diﬀer between models (Figure 1) generally
showing that when accounting for provision of environmental goods the eﬃciency levels for
most of the farms in the sample is relatively low and there is room for eﬃciency
improvement.
Table 4 shows the estimates of the parameters φj associated with the explanatory
variables of eﬃciency. There were 76 farms receiving environmental payments in the
sample. Results for M1 suggest that those farmers who receive relatively high
environmental payments (i.e. they conduct complex environmental management) are less
eﬃcient than those who receive relatively small payments for managing the environment or
receive no payment at all. Another interpretation of the results is that more eﬃcient farms
do not take on relatively high payments for managing the environment. However, this does
not mean that when less eﬃcient farms do take on environmental payments they do not
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increase eﬃciency. When the proxy for provision of environmental output is incorporated
in the analysis, the negative eﬀect that conducting environmental management has on
eﬃciency under M1 disappears. This may be suggesting that there is a correlation between
perceiving an environmental payment and the provision of environmental outputs.
On the contrary to what happens to environmental payments under M1, set-aside
payments are negatively correlated with ineﬃciency. A total of 67 farms in the sample
received set-aside payments during the period studied. Set-aside payments are calculated
per ha of utilised agricultural area. This eﬀectively is a measure of the percentage of arable
land. Therefore, our results suggest that those milk producer farms that also specialised in
arable production have lower levels of ineﬃciency than milk producer farms where arable
production is less important. This result may indicate that linkages between arable crop
production and milk production such as the use of arable crops for feeding are crucial to be
more eﬃcient. When the provision of environmental goods is incorporated in the analysis
(i.e. M2) farmers who receive a relatively high set-aside payment per ha are less eﬃcient
than farmers who receive relatively less set-aside payment per ha, opposite to the result
obtained using model M1 (i.e. not accounting for environmental output). The introduction
of provision of environmental goods in the analysis in the way speciﬁed here means that
farms where relatively more arable land is produced per ha (i.e. those receiving higher set
aside payments per ha) are less eﬃcient. The explanation for this is the following, since
our measure for provision of environmental goods is based on permanent pasture and
rough grassland areas, farms with large arable crop areas are likely to be penalised.
While the location of farms in LFAs was found unrelated to ineﬃciency under M1, when
provision of environmental outputs is disregarded, a farm was found to be more eﬃcient if
it is located in a LFA when such provision is observed. This result highlights that it is in
these areas where permanent and rough grassland (i.e. provision of environmental
outputs) is likely to be concentrated. With regard to regional diﬀerences looking at the
90% posterior coverage regions only farms located in East England are less eﬃcient than
farms in West Midlands (the benchmark region) under M1. Regions do not show any
diﬀerence in eﬃciency levels between them and the West Midlands region under M2.
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Despite based on the coverage regions the rest of determinants (e.g. farmer´s age, ﬁnancial
pressure, intensive) of ineﬃciency are not relevant, there are some interesting results worth
discussing. Model results show that ﬁnancial pressure tends to be positively correlated
with ineﬃciency only when environmental outputs are not taken into account. An
interpretation for this may be that, when environmental outputs are not taken into
consideration in the analysis, those farmers with higher ﬁnancial pressure tend to be less
eﬃcient than those who are not under ﬁnancial pressure because of farms ﬁnding
diﬃculties in obtaining ﬁnancial resources from banks, which prefer to loan to low risk
borrowers. This would hamper indebted farmers to incorporate new technologies. This
ﬁnding is in concordance with results obtained in previous studies on the inﬂuence of debt
ratios on technical eﬃciency (Paul et al., 2000, Iraizoz et al., 2005, Hadley, 2006).
However, this was not found under M2 which may indicate that the provision of
environmental outputs by farms does not require of large ﬁnancial resources, hence when
such provision is incorporated into the analysis the relative relevance of ﬁnancial pressure
on eﬃciency vanishes. Results suggest that farms located in the North West also tend to
be less eﬃcient than in the West Midlands although this is not as highly supported by the
coverage region as for the East England case.
Tables 5 and 6 show the 25 highest increase and drops in ranking according to their mean
eﬃciency scores respectively once the provision of environmental outputs is incorporated
to the eﬃciency analysis. It is clear that by introducing environmental output in the
analysis (M2) the ranking changes. The largest change in ranking was found to be 196
ranking positions down by farm 118 (from position 16 to position 212) whereas the largest
increase in ranking positions was found to be 187 ranking positions up by farm 139 (from
position 205 to position 18). With the incorporation of environmental output 84% of the
top 25 farms under the ranking using M1 are not in the top 25 under the ranking using
M2, and 81% of these are not even in the top 100. Focusing in the bottom of the ranking
88% of the bottom 25 farms when using M1 are not in the bottom 25 when M2 is used to
do the eﬃciency ranking, and 45% of these are not in the bottom 100. This result shows
how crucial the eﬃciency measure used is for the implementation of policies aiming at
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improving eﬃciency. A policy targeting those farms with low eﬃciency levels using a
ranking derived from a model which does not incorporate environmental outputs may be
targeting the wrong farms.
In order to test whether the relative farm eﬃciency levels obtained in both models diﬀer
(i.e. whether rankings using M1 and M2 are diﬀerent) we used Spearman's correlation
which conﬁrmed that relative farm eﬃciency level diﬀer between models (p-value>0.05).
Using the most extreme cases, farms 139 and 118, illustrate what occurs in rankings for
many of the farms. As pointed out above, when the environmental output is not included
in the analysis farm 118 is more likely to be more eﬃcient than farm 139 whereas when
the environmental output is included, farm 139 is more likely to be the most eﬃcient of
the two. In order to assess this, each draw corresponding to the eﬃciency score for farm
118 was compared with a draw corresponding to the eﬃciency score from farm 139. The
probability that the eﬃciency score of farm 118 was larger than a score from farm 139 was
then calculated, and the probability that farm 139 is more eﬃcient than farm 118 with M1
is (approximately) 0% whereas this probability increases to 99.37% with M2.
Conclusions
The consideration of environmental aspects in the analysis of technical eﬃciency of farms
enables us to create a more complete measure of eﬃciency, which is in line with current
EU policy agenda of having a sustainable agriculture sector that delivers environmental
goals as well as traditional market outputs.
The distribution of the mean and rankings of eﬃciencies across farms is greatly altered
when the provision of environmental outputs by farms is introduced in the analysis. This
ﬁnding that has policy implications. One of the pillars of EU and Defra agricultural policy
is to make agriculture both economically and environmentally sustainable. Based on the
results obtained, a standard view in which positive externalities are not accounted for does
not provide a realistic picture of which farms are both economically and environmentally
more eﬃcient. By using a holistic approach in which environmental outputs of the farm
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are included, useful information can be provided to policy makers about which farms may
need support in achieving both higher environmental and economic eﬃciency. Policy
makers may be interested in identifying those farms that are less eﬃcient in order to help
them to improve. Using the traditional approach with no accountability for environmental
output may well lead to targeting the wrong farms, i.e. those that are technically and
environmentally eﬃcient and overlook farms that could improve eﬃciency.
Farmers who received relatively high environmental payments (i.e. conducted relatively
many activities regarding countryside maintenance and management) were not found to be
associated with being the more or less eﬃcient farmers, when provision of environmental
goods were taken into account. On the contrary, when environmental outputs were not
taken into account such environmental payments were correlated with ineﬃciencies.
However, this diﬀerence may indicate that at least some of the activities conducted by the
farmer in order to receive environmental payments are related to our environmental goods
indicator.
When accounting for the provision of environmental outputs by farms our results suggest
that the least eﬃcient farms are those that have a relatively large farm area allocated to
arable crop production and are located outside LFAs. Farms with relatively large arable
crops areas are likely to cause negative environmental impacts to soil, water and
biodiversity due to pollution derived from nutrients and pesticides use. On the other hand,
an intensive dairy sector is not necessarily technically and environmentally more (or less)
eﬃcient than a non-intensive dairy sector.
Therefore, if a policy aim was to achieve higher eﬃciency levels for multifunctional farms,
that is, farms that can provide both conventional goods such as milk, cereals and oilseeds
as well as environmental goods such as providing habitats for birds, attention should be
paid to all farms, and especially to those that are less eﬃcient making sure, through
incentives (e.g. environmental payments), that they conduct activities that provide
environmental goods and improve their eﬃciency and avoid to do activities that have
negative impacts to the environment (e.g. reducing arable crop production).
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Fernández et al. (2005) pointed out that we must be cautious when using ﬁrm-speciﬁc
measures to rank ﬁrms or make statements about whether a ﬁrm is more or less eﬃcient
than others. In this respect, we acknowledge that there is not a unique indicator for the
provision of environmental outputs by farms that can be used in eﬃciency analysis and
diﬀerent environmental indicators may lead to diﬀerent results. However, we show that the
incorporation of provision of environmental goods by farms in eﬃciency analysis may have
important consequences when supporting policy makers decisions.
Looking forward, from 2006 the FBS includes questions on environmental characteristics
and activities; environmental crops and farm habitats; and countryside maintenance and
management activities, which includes questions on the costs associated with conducting
environmental activities. This information could be used to build an environmental output
indicator of the farm which would account for more speciﬁc activities in the farm than the
environmental indicator used here. Unfortunately, these questions were not introduced in
the FBS during the period used in this study (2000-2005).
To conclude we would like to emphasise that more consideration should be given to
including externalities, particularly positive externalities, into eﬃciency analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. dev.
Milk (Fisher index) 1 898 100 77
Other outputs (Fisher index) 0 678 125 94
Leasing quota out 0 15,103 208 926
Environmental output 0 0.98 0.17 0.22
Utilised Agricultural Area 16 883 118 109
Milk Quota 23,600 4,401,100 713,416 515,840
Number of cows 4 790 110 74
Leasing quota in 0 19,000 512 1,389
Machinery&General costs 4,531 195,274 40,484 30,772
Labour costs 12,009 231,573 46,101 28,835
Livestock costs (per cow) 84 1,880 511 208
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Table 2: Explanatory Variables for Ineﬃciency
Variable Deﬁnition
Set aside payment 1 if the farm above the median of the measure; 0 otherwise
Environmental payments 1 if the farm above the median of the measure ; 0 otherwise
Financial pressure 1 if ﬁnancial pressure>0.10 and 0 is ﬁnancial pressure<0.10
Quota market participation 1 if the farm participates in the quota market; 0 otherwise
Farmer's age_52 1 if the farmer's age is more than 52; 0 otherwise
Intensive 1 if the number of cows/farm size > 1.07; 0 otherwise
LFA 1 if the farm is located in a LFA; 0 otherwise
North East 1 if the farm is located in NE; 0 otherwise
Yorkshire & Humber 1 if the farm is located in Y&H; 0 otherwise
North West 1 if the farm is located in NW; 0 otherwise
East Midlands 1 if the farm is located in EM; 0 otherwise
East England 1 if the farm is located in EE; 0 otherwise
South East 1 if the farm is located in SE; 0 otherwise
South West 1 if the farm is located in SW; 0 otherwise
Wales 1 if the farm is located in WA; 0 otherwise
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Table 3: Slope Parameters
M1 M2
Coeﬀ. 90% posterior Coeﬀ. 90% posterior
α0 0.037 (0.029, 0.104) 0.739 (0.690, 0.771)
Other outputs -0.275 (−0.316,−0.233) -0.021 (−0.028,−0.013)
Environmental output   -0.981 (−0.992,−0.971)
Utilised Agricultural Area 0.089 (0.036, 0.143) 0.944 (0.899, 1.054)
Milk Quota+qui-quo 0.392 (0.292, 0.494) 0.017 (−0.002, 0.036)
Number of cows 0.427 (0.321, 0.537) 0.011 (−0.014, 0.037)
Machinery&General costs 0.083 (0.012, 0.154) 0.012 (−0.003, 0.026)
Labour costs 0.005 (−0.061, 0.071) -0.007 (−0.023, 0.010)
Livestock costs (per cow) 0.185 (0.126, 0.246) -0.004 (−0.018, 0.010)
Year 0.013 (−0.021, 0.048) 0.002 (−0.003, 0.007)
Year sq. -0.001 (−0.006, 0.004) 0.000 (−0.001, 0.000)
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Table 4: Eﬃciency Without Environmental Output vs. With Environmental
Output
M1 M2
Variable φj 90% posterior φj 90% posterior
Lambda 0.15 (0.09, 0.27) 1.25 (0.79, 1.99)
Environmental payment/ha 0.37 (0.02, 0.74) 0.11 (−0.19, 0.42)
Set-aside payment/ha -0.66 (−1.16,−0.15) 0.49 (0.13, 0.86)
Financial pressure 0.22 (−0.08, 0.52) 0.06 (−0.18, 0.31)
Quota Market participation -0.27 (−0.55, 0.02) 0.08 (−0.16, 0.31)
Age_52 -0.12 (−0.41, 0.16) 0.03 (−0.20, 0.26)
Intensive 0.34 (−0.04, 0.74) -0.04 (−0.35, 0.25)
LFA 0.14 (−0.21, 0.49) -0.38 (−0.67,−0.08)
North East 0.21 (−0.82, 1.48) 0.05 (−0.85, 1.28)
Yorkshire & Humber -0.09 (−0.84, 0.67) 0.24 (−0.34, 0.86)
North West 0.49 (−0.07, 1.06) 0.02 (−0.48, 0.54)
East Midlands -0.26 (−0.90, 0.41) -0.16 (−0.70, 0.41)
East England 0.81 (0.00, 1.74) -0.16 (−0.70, 0.41)
South East 0.15 (−0.52, 0.85) 0.09 (−0.45, 0.68)
South West 0.00 (−0.53, 0.56) 0.12 (−0.36, 0.60)
Wales -0.34 (−0.88, 0.20) -0.32 (−0.79, 0.14)
Note: Estimates based on Gibbs sample size 25,000. Numbers in parenthesis indicate 90% highest posterior
density intervals
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Table 5: Highest Increase in Ranking
Farm Rank M1 Rank M2 Rank diﬀ.
139 205 18 187
134 188 10 178
74 181 12 169
101 199 30 169
106 186 21 165
112 174 13 161
91 160 9 151
133 211 62 149
42 180 33 147
194 165 20 145
52 184 39 145
84 147 3 144
169 166 26 140
128 196 56 140
38 152 15 137
93 178 45 133
138 208 75 133
95 202 71 131
39 179 50 129
145 171 44 127
8 191 66 125
9 198 76 122
58 159 38 121
113 197 79 118
127 121 11 110
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Table 6: Highest Drop in Ranking
Farm Rank M1 Rank M2 Rank diﬀ.
118 16 212 -196
117 13 206 -193
23 10 202 -192
148 18 208 -190
147 9 196 -187
195 2 180 -178
157 23 199 -176
159 29 203 -174
150 15 188 -173
15 20 192 -172
154 1 171 -170
149 45 213 -168
161 33 193 -160
176 40 200 -160
18 49 204 -155
192 51 201 -150
13 46 195 -149
29 27 175 -148
212 38 186 -148
7 66 210 -144
163 24 158 -134
182 50 182 -132
146 56 187 -131
22 7 137 -130
19 36 165 -129
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Figure 1: Mean Eﬃciency Kernel Across Dairy Farms With and Without Provi-
sion of Environmental output
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